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An recent years, there has been much
"revisionist" research on the effects of
economic development programs at the
state and local level. There is now
substantial evidence that economic
development programs can help local
economies by reducing unemployment
and increasing earnings. Some, such as
Bartik (in his book Who Benefits from
State and Local Economic Development
Policies?), have gone beyond this to argue
that such local policies may benefit the
nation if the incentives are concentrated
in low-growth or high-unemployment
regions, because the benefits of jobs
created there will exceed the benefits lost
by not creating jobs in lowunemployment areas.
Are the economic development
incentives offered by states and cities
significantly higher in highunemployment places? This article
summarizes the results of a study,
sponsored by the Upjohn Institute, that
uses new data to examine the spatial
pattern of incentive offers.
In our research, we measured
competition among places based on the
dollar value of a locality's standing
incentive offer to industrial firms
expanding or locating in that locality. The
standing offer included the whole range
of competitive incentives over which state

or local governments have some direct
control: income tax investment and jobs
credits, property tax abatements, sales tax
exemptions, grants, loans, loan
guarantees, and firm-specific job-training
and infrastructure subsidies. Because
incentives may be embedded in tax codes,
and because the value of incentives to a
firm must be measured net of income tax
effects, we also modeled the federal
corporate income tax, each state's and
city's corporate income and net worth
taxes, the major state and local sales taxes
paid by business, and local property taxes.
We used the hypothetical firm method
to measure the value of competitive
incentives. We constructed financial
statements for 16 hypothetical firms,
representing the characteristics of a
typical large and small firm in each of
eight fast-growing manufacturing
industries. The model then measured the
net returns on a new plant investment,
after all taxes and incentives. The new
plant is located in one of 24 states, the 24
that account for the most manufacturing
employment in the United States
(combined, they represent 86% of the
total), and in one of 112 cities, randomly
selected from within these 24 states.

(continued on p. 3)
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From the Executive Director
he Institute over the years has
forged lasting and productive associations
with scholars and practitioners from many
organizations and in many parts of the
country. For 15 years starting in 1962, the
Institute maintained an office in
Washington, D.C., from which prominent
policy experts such as Sar Levitan, Saul
Blaustein, Herbert Striner, and Irving
Siegel led the Institute staff on important
projects related to federal employment
policy.
Times have changed. We have seen a
major shift in the locus of policy making,
with state and local governments
assuming much more responsibility for
social programs and with private
foundations promoting social initiatives.
We have also witnessed a revolution in
information technology, particularly
e-mail and Internet access to information.
Both changes have drastically reduced the
necessity of locating in the Washington
area in order to be a prominent player in
analyzing and evaluating policy and in
informing the policy debate.
Currently, our research affiliations
extend from Japan to Hungary and from
Canada to Australia. For instance, we
recently co-sponsored a conference with
the Canadian International Labor
Network (CILN), which brought together
20 prominent economists from six
European countries, Japan, Australia,
Canada, and the United States and was
organized by Peter Kuhn of McMaster
University. These scholars provided indepth country comparisons of worker
displacement and the extent of their
unemployment spells and earnings losses,
marking the first time that researchers
have been able to use micro-level data
across this many countries to address job
displacement, which is currently a major
concern to many European and Asian
countries. This research will appear as an
Institute publication.

Allan Hunt, Assistant Director of the
Institute, has finished a project in
Australia with the Victorian Workcover
Authority. Dr. Hunt led a team of
researchers to evaluate the performance
and structure of Victoria's workers'
compensation system and to provide
recommendations for improving the
system. This work is mentioned in his
article in this issue of the newsletter.
Closer to home, we have had the
privilege over the last six months of
working with one of the nation's leading
urbanologists, David Rusk. Author of the
widely acclaimed book Cities without
Suburbs, Mr. Rusk has worked with many
communities to address issues of housing,
neighborhoods, schools, urban
redevelopment and revitalization, and
urban sprawl. He is currently working in
the Kalamazoo area and has been based at
the Institute while conducting his
research. Institute staff have worked
closely with Mr. Rusk, collecting data and
analyzing local trends and conducting indepth studies of the performance of
Michigan school districts and the
feasibility of tax-base sharing arrange
ments among local cities and townships.
The Institute also keeps abreast of
recent research through our annual
Dissertation Award. Each year we receive
many excellent dissertations, and the
selection committee is always challenged
to choose the top three. As described in
the column to the right, this year's award
went to Steven Haider of the University of
Michigan for his work on income
inequality. Our congratulations to him
and to the two runners-up.
Given the extensive involvement of
the Institute with various agencies and
organizations, it is safe to say that our
location in the country's heartland has not
impeded our ability to carry out our
mission.
Randall W. Eberts

1998 Dissertation
Award Winners
The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to
announce the winner of its fourth annual
Dissertation Award: Steven J. Haider, of
the University of Michigan, for
"Econometric Studies of Long-Run
Earnings Inequality." Haider's
dissertation advisor was Gary Solon.
Two honorable mentions were also
chosen: Kanika Kapur of Northwestern
University for "Labor Market
Implications of Employer-Provided
Health Insurance," and Paul A. Smith of
the University of Wisconsin-Madison for
"The Impact of the 1981 Welfare Reforms
on Female-Headed Households." Kapur's
advisor was Bruce D. Meyer, and Smith's
was Robert Haveman.
Haider's dissertation comprises three
studies. First he examines the relationship
among annual earnings inequality,
lifetime earnings inequality, and earnings
stability. Then he examines the long-run
earnings inequality at the family level,
where he finds that the increasing
earnings inequality for husbands was
responsible for 75 percent of the gross
increase in family earnings inequality.
Haider also develops an estimation
technique, used in other portions of his
work, that is applicable to a broad class of
incomplete data problems.
Kapur addresses the gap between
policy and research in the areas of
medical insurance portability and job
mobility, small firms and the small-group
health insurance market, and the impact
of recent state-level health insurance
legislation. Smith uses two approaches to
analyze the effects of changes in welfareprogram benefit formulas and eligibility
rules on the economic well-being of, and
the choices made by, low-income
individuals.
Winners of the Dissertation Award
receive a cash prize of $2,000. Each
honorable mention receives a $500 prize.
The deadline for submission for the
1999 award is July 7, 1999. Any
individual whose dissertation has been
accepted during the 12-month period of
July 1, 1998, to June 30, 1999, is eligible
for the 1999 prize.
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Is There Significant Variation
in Returns across Locations?
Is there sufficient variation in returns
on investment across states and cities that
tax and incentive differences could affect
location decisions? If incentives have
little effect on profitability at different
sites, there is little reason to worry about
their effects on redistributing
employment.
We found large differences between
the returns available at the "best"
locations and returns available at the
"worst" locations, considering state and
local tax systems and tax incentives (but
not other incentives). Even when we
ignored variation within states by
focusing on a representative city in each
state, we found effective state/local tax
rates on new investment that ranged, for

example, from 1.7% to 10.2% for a small
but profitable manufacturer of soaps and
toiletries, and from 4.1% to 23.8% for a
large but low-profit automobile
manufacturer. These are the extreme
cases; for the typical sector, the highesttax state placed a tax burden on
manufacturers that was about three times
as large as that in the lowest-tax state.
Another way of examining the
magnitude of incentives is to measure the
difference between the best and the worst
standing offers among our sample of cities
and then to convert this difference to an
hourly wage equivalent. For some firms,
the results were startling. For the large
drug firm, the difference between the best
and worst sites translated into an average
hourly wage difference of $1.82. For
most firms modeled, the equivalent hourly
wage difference between the best and
worst sites was between $0.65 and $0.95
per hour. Moreover, the spreads between

cities at, for example, the 80th and 20th
percentiles or the 75th and 25th
percentiles remained large. Thus, it seems
reasonable to conclude that, at least at the
extremes, taxes and incentives are
potentially large enough to influence
location decisions.
The inclusion of non-tax incentives
very often did little to change the majority
of cities in the top 20 or bottom 20. In
most cases, cities that were highly
competitive after taxes and tax incentives
were also highly competitive after the
inclusion of non-tax incentives. Overall,
non-tax incentives did not ameliorate, but
actually accentuated, the tax differentials
between the best and worst cities.
Three tentative conclusions emerge:
1) the differences in investment returns
across states and cities due to tax and
incentive differences are quite substantial,
and it is certainly plausible that these
differences are large enough to influence

Figure 1 Rate of Return on New Plant Investment in the 25 Cities with Highest Return after Incentives:
Multi-state Instruments Manufacturer, $180 Million Plant
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location choices; 2) the magnitude of
incentives, relative to returns after taxes
but without incentives, is substantial; and
3) incentive competition per se is not
producing convergence across sites; if
anything, it is increasing inter-site
differences.

Are Returns Higher in
High-Unemployment Cities?
We focus here on the results for the
sample of 112 cities, using actual local
tax rates and incentive programs as well
as state taxes and incentives. Almost all
of the correlations between
unemployment and taxes or incentives are
of modest size. There is a consistently
negative relationship between unem
ployment and returns after basic taxes
(without any incentives); the highestunemployment places have the highest tax
burdens. There is a consistently positive
relationship between unemployment and
tax incentives: the highest-unemployment
places offer the largest state and local tax
incentives. This result is dominated by
local property-tax abatements and by
enterprise-zone (EZ) incentives; we
deliberately allowed the largest incentives
available in a city (which would be
enterprise-zone incentives in the 40% of
our cities with such zones) to represent
the city as a whole. Considering non-tax
incentives, there is no clear pattern of
providing inducements to shift jobs either
towards or away from highunemployment places.
Figure 1 illustrates the lack of any
consistent pattern by focusing on a firm
that was typical in terms of the correlation
of taxes and incentives with
unemployment the instruments
manufacturer building a $180 million
plant. We show only the top 25 cities (those
with the highest return for this plant after
taking into account all taxes and
incentives) ordered by unemployment rate.
For each city, the graph shows the rate of
return after basic taxes and how this rate of
return is improved through the provision of
enterprise zone incentives and other (tax
and non-tax) incentives. Some cities that
ranked poorly after basic taxes improved
their position dramatically through nonenterprise zone incentives; others did so
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through enterprise zone credits. Some
cities, including some with relatively low
unemployment, were very competitive
without incentives and enhanced their
position further through incentives. But
incentives are not primarily compensating
for high basic taxes.
While incentives do modestly favor
places with higher unemployment, these
incentives only offset the tendency of
basic state taxes on business to be higher
in high-unemployment states. The end
result is a spatial pattern of returns on new
investment that is essentially random:
there is no discernible tendency for
returns to be more attractive in highunemployment or in low-unemployment
places. It appears that, after at least a
decade and a half of intense competition
for investment and jobs and the
widespread adoption of pro-development
tax policies and development programs,
states and cities have produced a system
of taxes and incentives that provides no
clear inducement for firms to invest in
higher-unemployment places. It is true
that in the absence of that competition the
pattern of returns might well favor the
least distressed places. However, this is
difficult to say for certain, because some
of the "perversity" we observed in state
taxes may itself be the result of
competitive pressures that produced
changes in the underlying tax codes of
certain states. Some incentives are
embedded in what we modeled as the
"basic" tax system.

Conclusions: The National
Benefits of Competitive Economic
Development Policy
These results are consistent with the
following arguments (though they
certainly cannot be taken as proof):
1) State and local tax reductions and
development incentives are adopted for a
variety of reasons, high unemployment
perhaps being one, but slow growth and
simple imitation of others being more
important reasons.
2) Even where economic distress, as
measured by high unemployment, may
have provided the original political
impetus to cut business taxes or adopt
incentives, these measures are likely to

persist even if state economic
performance improves.
To the extent that tax and incentive
competition results in a redistribution of
jobs, our research lends little support to
the argument that this redistribution has
beneficial effects for the nation as a whole
(by shifting jobs from places with low
unemployment to places with high
unemployment). Neither can we say that it
is clearly harmful (i.e., by providing
inducements to redistribute jobs in the
opposite direction). Of course, one can
only speculate what the spatial pattern of
returns on investment in 1992 would have
looked like had states and cities never
undertaken to influence their economic
fortunes by offering inducements to
industry in competition with one another.
Only if this pattern would have been
distinctly counterproductive (with higher
returns in lower-unemployment places)
could one conclude that competition has
been beneficial, by nullifying such effects.
This article describes research published in
the Upjohn Institute book of the same title. Drs.
Fisher and Peters are professors of urban
planning at the University of Iowa.

The Institute is interested in publishing
books in these areas:
Causes and consequences of unem
ployment
Compensation: earnings and benefits
Economic development of local labor
markets
Family labor issues
Labor-management relations
Social insurance and income mainte
nance programs
Work arrangements
Workforce quality: education and
training
See our Web site (at www.upjohninst.org/
research.html) for descriptions of these
areas.
Please submit manuscripts or proposals to
H. Allan Hunt
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
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H. Allan Hunt

a special burden on the administrator and
regulator, the Victorian WorkCover
Authority (VWA), to provide appropriate
incentives for all participants in the
workers' compensation system. The VWA
bears the risk and holds the money. Some
14 private "agents" market the insurance,
collect the premiums, and make the
benefit payments. Another unique
Australian invention is the "employer
excess." In Victoria, the employer is
directly responsible for making the first
10 days of income maintenance
payments, as well as the first $317 of
medical expenses. This is thought to
increase employer incentives for
prevention, to raise the likelihood of
prompt payment of income maintenance
benefits, and to reduce system
administrative costs.

introduction
Only three countries in the world
maintain sub-national workers'
compensation systems: Australia, Canada,
and the United States. Three models are
used to organize the insurance
responsibilities for making the payments
to injured or ill workers: private market,
exclusive public insurer, and mixed
(although the three models do not
correspond exactly with the three
countries). All 10 Canadian provinces,
6 U.S. states, and 3 jurisdictions in
Australia use the exclusive public insurer
approach; the remaining 44 U.S. states
and 4 jurisdictions in Australia use a
predominately private market approach;
and 3 Australian states use a mixed
approach, in which the public fund bears
the underwriting risk, but private firms
collect and disburse the money.
We will look at each of the three
models, one from each country. 1 Studying
different jurisdictions, even though from
different nations, follows the tradition of
using the "laboratory of the states" to
inform policy decisions. We will describe
the essential features of each system and
then review system performance.
British Columbia
British Columbia has an exclusive
public fund (monopoly) that collects the
insurance assessment from employers and
pays the specified benefits to workers.
Virtually all employers are required to
purchase coverage from the Workers'
Compensation Board of British Columbia
(WCB). Premiums are determined by the
WCB annually for some 70 classes of
employer and are designed to ensure that,
in the aggregate, all future benefits arising
from injuries and illnesses in the current
year can be paid from the funds collected
in that year. The WCB also attempts to see

that employers are treated equitably in
their relative cost of assessment.
Experience-rating provides that
assessment rates can vary by one-third
(either up or down) from the class
average. The British Columbia fund is
fully forward funded (unlike many
others), and 35-40 percent of annual
income is currently derived from
investment earnings on reserves held
against future obligations.
Michigan
Michigan has a fairly pure private
system, which is noteworthy for a large
segment (about 50%) of self-insurance.
This self-insured sector includes the huge
firms of the auto industry and an extensive
"group self-insurance" program for
smaller employers. Michigan is also noted
for its very early, and successful,
deregulation of insurance rate-making in
1983 (the second jurisdiction in the
United States to do so). Insurance prices
are set by individual insurers based on
market considerations, with no
interference from the state. With the sale
of its state accident fund in 1994,
Michigan demonstrated that it did not
wish to foster the competition of public
firms with private firms; Michigan put its
faith completely in the market.
Victoria
Victoria has a workers' compensation
system that is unique to Australia,
characterized by public underwriting
(risk-bearing) but private marketing,
premium collection, and claims
administration. The impetus for this
system came from widespread
dissatisfaction with the private system
before 1985 and strong revulsion to the
excesses of a monopoly public system
from 1985 to 1992. This "third way" puts

Benefit Differences and Similarities
So, we have three quite different
administrative and regulatory systems
designed to accomplish basically the
same tasks. Before looking at overall
system performance, we should note
some significant differences in benefits
among the three systems. The first
difference is in the waiting period before
wage replacement benefits commence. In
British Columbia, the public fund pays
from the first day of lost wages. In
Michigan, the insurer begins paying after
7 days have passed. In Victoria, the
employer is responsible for paying the
first 10 days of lost wages directly. These
differences have significant implications
for the number of claims that are
compensable and, hence, that the
administrative entity has to deal with.
They also have implications for any
attempt to compare the performance of
these three systems.
Wage replacement levels for injured
workers also differ and are set by statute.
Michigan specifies that injured workers
shall receive 80 percent of their pre-injury
net wage (net of taxes), subject to a
maximum at 90% of the state average
weekly wage ($533/week in 1997).2
British Columbia provides 75 percent
wage replacement against the net wage,
again subject to a maximum ($580/week
in 1997). Benefits are free of federal and
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state income taxes in both British
Columbia and Michigan. Victoria replaces
95 percent of the workers' pre-injury base
wage (not including overtime or premium
pay), subject to a maximum of 100% of
average weekly earnings ($505/week in
1997); this drops to 60 percent at 26
weeks unless the worker is totally
incapacitated or is found to have a
"serious injury." Benefits are taxable in
Victoria; it is also common practice for the
employer to "top-up" the compensation
benefit to 100% of the pre-injury weekly
earnings in a collective agreement.
Finally, permanent disability award
criteria vary. Victoria is just implementing
(as of 30 September 1998) a new system
of impairment rating, based on the
American Medical Association's Guides
to the Evaluation of Impairment, 4th
Edition. This system will use medical
practitioners, independent medical
examiners, and medical review panels to
rate the impairment of each worker,
replacing the serious injury system, which
proved to be too difficult to control.
British Columbia uses a sophisticated
system of interdisciplinary disability
evaluation that includes medical doctors,
vocational rehabilitation practitioners,
and expert claims personnel. The
disability pension awarded to a worker is
the higher of the estimated medical
impairment level or the estimated lifetime
earnings losses. Michigan in theory pays
wage-loss benefits for life. However, a
system of compromise and release
settlements ("redemptions") has evolved
that serves to "cash out" the worker's
claim in exchange for the employer's
release from further liability. This system
is run by the lawyers, who tend to think of
it as a rather sophisticated disability rating
system that responds to the many nuances
of individual worker situations, injuries,

etc. Critics tend to think of it as a "crap
shoot" where the financial results bear
little correlation to the disabilities.

Workers' Compensation Performance
It is extraordinarily difficult to make
comparisons across jurisdictions because
of statutory differences and variations in
local practice. Most comparisons are
actually more misleading than
informative. However, comparisons on the
broadest aggregates may be meaningful.
First, the difference in the number of
injuries (claims per 100 workers) is vast.
British Columbia has more than twice as
many compensable claims as Michigan or
Victoria (Table 1), but this primarily
reflects the differences in the waiting
periods for wage-loss benefits. On the
other hand, aggregate benefits paid per
worker in 1997 are quite similar. Since
aggregate benefits per worker reflects both
the number of workers who receive
payments and the average payment
received, it is a better index of the actual
burden of workers' compensation
payments on the economy. 3 Basically,
Victorian workers are receiving lump-sum
payments for specific injuries, pain and
suffering benefits, and common law
settlements that bring them above the
North American standard. Michigan
workers receive lump-sum settlements
that capitalize their future wage-loss,
whereas British Columbia workers receive
periodic income maintenance payments.
Table 1 also reports the average
employers' cost of workers'
compensation insurance. Michigan is the
lowest (1.72 percent of payroll), followed
by Victoria and then British Columbia. Of
course, these results do not control for
industry structure or a host of other
differences between the three
jurisdictions.

Table 1 Workers Compensation Comparison, 1997
Measure
Wage loss claims/100 workers
Benefit payments/worker
Employer cost/$100 payroll
*Victoria data are for 1997-98 fiscal year.

British
Columbia
4.1
$284.27
$2.23

Michigan
1.5
$278.93
$1.72

Note: Dollar values in U.S. $.

Victoria*
1.5
$335.56
$1.80

What this quick analysis seems to
show is that comparisons between
different workers' compensation systems
are not simple. Moreover, the systems'
differing structures are not the reason for
the differences in performance. Rather,
each system is an organic whole that has
its own internal logic, which is why it is
not possible to just lift features from one
system that seems to work and insert them
in another system that doesn't work. What
is needed, rather, is good, aggressive
management and attention to system
indicators. This is one social policy area
where the "continuous improvement"
model makes more sense than "best
practice." Through the continuous
improvement path, we can all attain more
efficient and equitable workers'
compensation systems.
Notes
1. These are jurisdictions where the Institute has
done work and with which we are quite familiar. The
references cited below provide more detail on these
three workers' compensation jurisdictions.
2. All monetary units are in U.S. dollars, based
on average currency conversion rates for 1997.
3. Ignoring the privately borne costs. In Michi
gan, injured workers bear the first 7 days of wage-loss
costs, while in Victoria, the employer bears the first
10 days of wage-loss costs. These costs are included
in the British Columbia figures.

Suggestions for further reading

Duncan S. Ballantyne, and Lawrence
Shiman, Revisiting Workers' Compensation
in Michigan, Administrative Inventory,
Workers Compensation Research Institute,
Cambridge, MA, October 1997.
H. Allan Hunt, Peter S. Earth, Terrance J.
Bogyo, Alan Clayton, Robert W. Klein, and
Ralph W. McGinn, Victorian Workers'
Compensation System: Review and
Analysis, Volume I, Victorian WorkCover
Authority, Melbourne, Australia, August
1997.
H. Allan Hunt, Peter S. Barth, and Michael
J. Leahy, The Workers' Compensation
System of British Columbia: Still in
Transition, Workers' Compensation Board
of British Columbia, Richmond, British
Columbia, March 1996.
Dr. Hunt is Assistant Executive Director of
the Upjohn Institute.
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Explanations and Policy
Implications

Peter S. Fisher and Alan H. Peters,
University of Iowa

This book by provides clear and
concise information on what is often an
emotionally charged subject
economic
development
incentives. The
authors' extensive
research reveals
tax and incentive
policies across the
24 most
industrialized
states in the
U.S.A. and a
sample of 112 cities from within those
states.
"[Fisher and Peters'] research is the first
rigorous study that provides us with
significant information about the average
magnitude of economic development
incentives in the United States, how these
incentives vary across different types of
firms, and which states and cities offer the
biggest incentives. It is painstakingly
careful and fairminded. No serious
discussion of federal, state, or local policy
toward incentives should take place
without taking account of their findings.
"Economic development researchers
should consider this book a basic reference
tool. Economic developers who want to
know what the competition is doing should
also find this book to be essential reading."
Timothy J. Bartik, W.E. Upjohn Institute
307 pp. $29 cloth ISBN 0-88099-184-4
$19 paper ISBN 0-88099-183-6 / 1998.

'-Kalman Rupp
Social Security Administration
David C. Stapleton, The Lewin Group,
Editors

This collection of original papers
reveals why caseloads of the nation's
two largest income entitlement
programs for disability Social
Security Disability Income (SSDI) and
Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) have soared. Using the Social
Security Administration's own data,
the authors are able to point to factors
that are contributing to the programs'
\ growth, including
IP; : ;^r;;
program design,
changing
demographics,
the labor market,
and the
interaction with
other programs in
the nation's social
safety net.

Contributors include Kalman
Rupp, David C. Stapleton, Kevin A.
Coleman, Kimberly A. Dietrich,
Gina A. Livermore, Aaron Yelowitz,
Charles G. Scott, Mary C. Daly,
L. Scott Muller, Peter M. Wheeler,
John Bound, Sherrie Kossoudji,
Gema Ricart-Moes, Andrea
Zeuschner, Gilbert Fisher, Melinda
Upp, Larry Masanari, Celeste
Hemingson, Charles Jones, Stanford
G. Ross, Andrew I. Batavia, Howard
H. Goldman, Jane L. Ross, Carolyn
L. Weaver, Susan M. Daniels, Jane
West, Richard V. Burkhauser,
Patricia M. Owens, and Craig
Thornton.
436 pp. $33 cloth ISBN 0-88099-188-7
$23 paper ISBN 0-88099-187-9 / 1998.

Topics in
Unemployment
Insurance
Financing
Wayne Vroman, Urban Institute

When or if the next recession
hits, some states may find that their
unemployment insurance (UI) trust
fund balances will fall short of what's
needed to pay for growing numbers of
UI claims. The reason, says Wayne
Vroman, is that the economic boom of
the 1990s has
given states the
confidence to
enact new
UNEMPLOYMENT financing schemes
INSURANCE
that allow a
financing
serious reduction
in the size of UI
trust fund
balances.
Vroman warns
that, because of
recent financing practices, "States are
more at risk for insolvency in the late
1990s than they were in 1990. A
repetition of widespread and largescale borrowing of the past is a distinct
possibility."
He bases this statement on an
empirical study that examines
historical levels of states' UI trust fund
balances between recessions and the
specific methods used to finance trust
fund balances. These methods include
traditional means of financing, taxbase indexing, state reserve funds, and
"flexible" financing such as solvency
taxes and legislative response
mechanisms. In addition, he addresses
the tradeoffs of financing UI debt by
either borrowing from the U.S.
Treasury or issuing state bonds.
160 pp. $24 cloth ISBN 0-88099-194-1
$14 paper ISBN 0-88099-193-3 / 1998.
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